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 In the course of his theory of intentionality, John Searle introduces the operatory 
notion of “intention in action”. He argues that not all intentions are formed prior to the 
actual action being taken place. Some intentions emerge and evolve during the 
performance of a given action. That is the case, for instance, when someone suddenly 
hits another man1. There are several features that help Searle to distinguish between this 
sort of intentions and the more commonly considered “prior intentions”. First of all, 
when expressed they present themselves under two different forms: “I will do A” or “I 
am going to do A” indicates a prior intention; “I am doing A” indicates an “intention in 
action”. In the latter case, intention and action are inseparable (Searle, 1983: 84). The 
way Searle assimilates “intentions in action” and actions themselves is very interesting 
and proves to be, indeed, the core of his argument on the subject of intentions. Their 
pervasiveness eliminates the idea that we could have something like “pure actions”, as 
could be the case with the man that “suddenly gets up and starts pacing about the room” 
(1983: 84) while thinking on a philosophical problem. However unconscious or 
“automatic” an action appears to be, it is always accompanied by an “intention in 
action”. In this point, Searle’s text suffers an interesting development. By the beginning 
of the chapter, Searle clearly mentions that “all intentional actions have intentions in 
action” (1983: 85). But after a few pages, he is ready to drop the adjective “intentional” 
and simply postulate, “all action is a composite entity of which one component is an 
intention in action” (1983: 107). The notion of “intention in action” seems to have 
                                                 
1 Cf. Searle, J. (1983), Intentionality - An essay In the philosophy of mind, 1983, p. 84. 
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acquired such a weight that it can now be clearly specified that “there are no actions, not 
even unintentional actions, without intentions” (1983:107). That is, one has to have an 
“intention in action” not only to have an intentional action, but also to be able to classify 
an event as an action. 
 It would be interesting to compare Searle’s notion of “intention in action” with 
that of “pure intention” as proposed by Davidson2. In a way they seem to be the most 
extreme far-ends of the spectrum of possible connections between intentions and 
actions. The first is so tightly connected to the action that is hard to realize in what way 
it can be extracted or thought of independently of the event that is taking place. The 
second is so distant from any action that is quite difficult to understand what it could 
really mean or how could it be still acknowledged as a full-blown intention. In fact, the 
close intimacy between “intention in action” and action explains, in Searle’s view, why 
“there is a more intimate connection between actions and intentions than there is 
between (…) beliefs and states of affairs” (1983: 107): actions contain intentions in 
actions whereas states of affairs do not contain beliefs or desires. 
 I shall attempt to follow Searle’s notion of intentions in action in a threefold 
way. First of all, I’ll examine the global notion of Intentionality. Secondly, I’ll try to 
understand how the connection between prior intentions and intentions-in-action can be 
thought to occur. And thirdly, I’ll question the possibility of intentions in action as a 
distinctive kind of Intentional state.  
 
1. Intentionality 
 
                                                 
2 Cf. Davidson, D., Essays on Actions and Events, p.83. 
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First of all, we have to understand the role that intentions in action play in the 
economy of Searle’s views on Intentionality in general and on intentions in particular. 
  Briefly, Intentionality is the stipulation of conditions of satisfaction and 
constitutes a wide notion overarching different sorts of mental states. Descriptive 
statements about the world represent their truth conditions just like promises represent 
their fulfilment conditions and orders represent their conditions of obedience. This also 
means that in order to be classifiable as Intentional any mental state or event has to be 
about or directed at something in the world. In order to analyse whether a given mental 
state is satisfied or not, we must consider two different and, in a way, complementary 
kinds of adjustments between itself and the “independently existing world”: the 
direction of fit and the direction of causation. Searle recovers these two notions from his 
theory of speech acts and, particularly, from his distinction between the “assertive class” 
(statements, descriptions, etc) of speech acts, on the one hand, and the “assertive” 
(orders, commands, requests, etc) and “commissive” (promises, vows, pledges, etc) 
classes (cf. 1983: 7) of speech acts on the other. A descriptive proposition member of 
the first class has to match the world. If it succeeds in doing so it is true, otherwise it is 
false. I.e., it is the proposition’s responsibility, so to speak, to fit the given state of 
affairs. The direction of fit is then said to be word-world. In this case, it is the sate of 
affairs that causes the proposition. In the case of the commissive and directive classes – 
of which intentions constitute an important set of members – the responsibility lies with 
the object or state of affairs to which the particular statement is being directed. "If I give 
the child the order ‘Close the door!’ and the door remains open, it is not I who am a liar 
but the child that is disobedient”3 It was the sate of affairs that did not fit the statement.  
The direction of fit is said to be word- or mind-world. The direction of causation is from 
                                                 
3 From A. Kenny, Wittgenstein, p. 112. 
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world to mind or word. There is obviously here an asymmetry between both directions: 
the world fits the way I intend it to be only if I cause to be that way, and the proposition 
fits the world it is supposed to describe only if indeed the world was its cause. The 
neatness ((1983: 96) of this asymmetry will prove to be a major factor in the 
introduction of intentions in action. 
Although integrated in the philosophical tradition that assimilates “directedness” or 
“aboutness” to Intentionality, Searle is particularly careful in the way he distinguishes 
his language-based account4 from the more classical definitions of the term. First of all, 
beliefs, fears, hopes and desires have to be transitive in order to be classifiable as 
Intentional, i.e., they have to be about something (1983: 1), i.e., they have to have a 
specific content. The usual test to determine whether some mental state have Intentional 
instances consists then to ask “What is S about? What is S of? What is it an S that?” 
(1983: 2). In all these cases we are asking for the set of conditions that satisfy the 
description of this mental state. Secondly, Intentional states are not necessarily 
conscious sates5. Most of the beliefs that constitute each person’s network of beliefs 
were never explicitly addressed or contemplated. They remain, nevertheless, Intentional 
for their content is easily accessible. Thirdly and more significantly – and this point will 
become paramount in Searle’s parallel between intentions and perceptive states – 
intentions and intending are just a case of Intentionality side by side with states such as 
beliefs, desires, hopes, ambitions, etc. The way intentions are said to be directed 
towards an eventual state of affairs is not a special kind of Intentionality6 – this, again, 
will prove to be essential when comparing the Intentional contents (i.e., their conditions 
                                                 
4 Cf. 1983: 5. 
5 “Intentionality is not the same as consciousness. Many conscious sates are not Intentional (…) and many 
Intentional states are not conscious (…)” (1983: 2). This constitutes an important step in order to understand 
intentions in action as Intentional states since most of the time they are not conscious to the agent. 
6 This is in fact the reason why Searle distinguishes the technical term of Intentionality, by capitalizing the 
word. 
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of satisfaction) of both intentions and perceptions. The suggestion that intentions may 
be some special or even paradigmatic instantiation of Intentionality has lead, for 
instance, to the wrong notion that beliefs and desires must, in a way, “intend something” 
(1983: 3). Fourthly, Intentional states are not to be confused with mental acts either. 
When involved in an Intentional state – like believing it is raining – we are not doing 
anything. The test proposed by Searle in order to acknowledge this point is interesting 
in regard to the question of intentions in action: if someone asks us “What are you doing 
now?” the rules of our common language game do not prompt us to utter an answer of 
the sort “I am desiring to go out to dinner”. Instead, we would say something like “I am 
leaving to go to the movies”. The act-level and the state-level are to be kept apart in this 
respect.  
Following this specific description of Intentionality, Searle’s question is clearly 
outlined: 
“What exactly is the relation between Intentional states and the 
objects and states of affairs that they are in some sense about or 
directed at? What kind of a relation is named by “Intentionality” 
anyhow and how can we explain Intentionality without using 
metaphors like “directed”?” 
 
 
 It is in order to answer these questions that Searle approaches the subject of 
Intentionality with the aid of his theory of speech-acts7. Analogous to speech acts, 
Intentional states are said to represent objects and states of affairs (1983: 4, 11, 13). 
Now, since intentions in action will later be described as presenting but not representing 
their respective bodily movement we have to take a closer look at what Searle means by 
“representation”. The proximity between speech acts’ representation and its Intentional 
counterpart is particularly useful in order to disengage the notion of “Intentional 
                                                 
7 It must be added that although Searle’s account for Intentionality is deeply based in his theory of speech 
acts he does not mean to imply “that Intentionality is essentially and necessarily linguistic” (1983: 5). Both 
animals as small babies can be said to have Intentionality in spite their lack of linguistic skills. Language 
functions only as a “heuristic device” that helps us get a better understanding of what is going on in the case 
of Intentional states. More than that, it is language that derives from Intentionality and not the opposite.  
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representational content” from any ontological assumption (1983: 12). An intention or a 
belief constitutes a “representation” only because it has a propositional content and a 
“psychological mode” (1983: 12) or what Searle called, in the context of the “speech 
acts” theory, an “illocutionary force”8. “Representation” is the name of the connection 
between both these elements, and, namely, the way a given psychological mode 
attributes a direction of fit to a given propositional content.   
 If I command the child to open the door, my Intentional state can be represented 
by a formula such as “Command (The child opens the doors)”, “Psychological State 
(Content)” or “S (r)” (cf. 1983: 6), thus distinguishing both components. Notice then 
how the neutral propositional content is ready to be adopted by numerous other 
psychological modes: “Believe (The child opens the door), Desire (The child opens the 
door)” etc. In a way then, "any prescription can be conceived as a description, and any 
description as a prescription”9.   
 There are thus numerous ways to linguistically notify objects or states of affairs 
and the effective presence of that some object or state of affairs is no longer a necessary 
condition of the propositional meaning. That is why – I think – Searle dismisses all 
ontological implications from his notion of “representation”: the proposition involved is 
not the object of an Intentional state but rather its content (cf. 1983: 18), i.e., it is not 
something that is being used by a certain Intentional state (in which case, the state 
would become an act) but rather an intrinsic component of that very state. Thus, it can 
be said, for instance, that “the belief is identical with the proposition construed as 
believed” (1983: 19). Or as Wittenstein would put it, “"it is in language that expectation 
                                                 
8 Following Wittgenstein’s suggestive example in his treatment of this very same subject8, we can adopt here 
the “language of chemistry” and distinguish between the propositional radical, i.e., the content in a neutral 
regime, and the indicator of mode (cf. Philosophical Investigations, .   §22). 
9 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Notes. 
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and satisfaction touch each other”10. In this point, Searle’s notion of intentionality seems 
very close to that of Husserl’s. The husserlian intentional object is not a fact nor 
requires to be connected with any fact. It is an inextricable part of the formulation of 
desire or expectation. 
The neutral radical that describes the supposed referent of the Intentional 
representation can be stated either as being present or not present, problematic, waited 
for, apologized, desired, demanded, intended, etc. All that matters to Searle’s enquiry, 
then, are the logical properties of such a statement. The logical function of all these 
psychological modes lies in the way they attribute the neutral content a specific 
direction of fit, telling us where to look for the conditions that satisfy that same content. 
And the logical function of the content is to determine a specific set of conditions of 
satisfaction – my order is satisfied if and only if the child opens the door by way of my 
commanding her. The important conclusion of all this, then is that “the specification of 
the content is already a specification of the conditions of satisfaction” (1983: 13), i.e., 
“there is no way an agent can have a belief or a desire without it having its conditions of 
satisfaction” (1983: 22). Thus, any Intentional state is intrinsically a representation and 
Searle is dismissing here Dennett’s assumption that in order to have a representation 
one has to elicit the presence of “some agent who uses some entity – a picture or a 
sentence or some other object [i.e., what we called the “propositional radical”] as a 
representation”11. This constitutes an important specification of Searle’s use of 
“representation”: Dennett’s point is valid for the cases he mentions, i.e., cases of 
“derived Intentionality” such as pictures or sentences. In these cases, we can indeed 
separate the actual entity – say, the picture of a flower – from its usage qua 
                                                 
10 Philosophical Investigations, §445. Wittgenstein’s concept would also dismiss the ontological separation 
between “internal intention” and “exterior object” as proposed, for instance, by Russell (cf. N. Gier: 
"Wittgenstein, Intentionality, and Behaviourism" in Metaphilosophy, vol. 13, n.1, January 1982, pp.46-57).   
 
11 D. Dennett, Brainstorms, 122-5, quoted in Searle, 1983: 21. 
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representation. But this isn’t so in the case of Intentional states: they are always and 
intrinsically representations, but not of something that could supposedly exist outside 
them. If we say that someone is conscious of the conditions that satisfy her belief we are 
not postulating a second level Intentional state overlooking the original state of belief, 
i.e., we are not saying that she is using her belief. The conditions of satisfaction are not 
imposed on the belief; they are an intrinsic part of it. 
 
2. Intentions 
 
One way to scrutinize – albeit partially and without sufficient detail (cf. 1983: 
36) - the complex beam of logical relations connecting psychological mode and 
Intentional content would be to engage in the sort of “Bel” and “Des” analysis 
exemplified by Searle (1983: 29-36). There can be different degrees of proximity 
between the psychological state S and content r, or, to put it in another way, different 
levels upon which the propositional content can be presented. There is, namely, a 
chronological difference between the various ways of delivering that neutral content. 
We can see how this is, to some extent, measurable, by looking at the way Searle tests 
and acknowledges the fact that “all Intentional states (…) contain a Bel or a Des or 
both, and that in many cases the Intentionality of the sate is explained by the Bel or the 
Des” (1983: 35). (Notice that this does not mean, as Searle proves it, that all Intentional 
states are reducible to Bel and Des.) 
 But what are “Bel” and “Des”? They correspond to the broad categories of 
“beliefs” and “desires” that many philosophers tend to think as constituting the most 
basic Intentional states. If we take them as constituting some sort of action operators 
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they seem to participate of all our Intentional states12. Beliefs seem somehow to be 
connected to the present, and more specifically, to our present matrix of beliefs, while 
desires seem to be mainly directed to the future, although Searle is careful enough to 
note that “we will need to allow for cases of “desire” directed of states of affairs known 
or believed to have occurred in the past” (1983: 29) (e.g., “I wish I hadn’t done it”). 
Arguably, our connection to our beliefs is a closer one than our connection to our 
desires. 
 Let us turn to the “hardest case” of Intentional states, i.e., to intentions. Belief 
requirements are a usual component of philosophical approaches to the concept of 
intentions. The acceptance of the Strong Belief Requirement entails that if S intends to 
do A, S believes that she will do A13. A more modest version places a “negative belief 
constraint”14 on intentions: S intends to do A only if she does not believe that she 
(probably) will not do A. The Strong Consistency Requirement determines that 
intentions have to be in a strongly consisted relation to one’s general set of beliefs: if I 
intend to do A then I should not have any beliefs inconsistent with the belief that I will 
A. And it is also clear that the logical relations between the psychological state of 
intending and its Intentional content do have something in common with those 
pertaining to the Intentional state of desiring. Therefore, and to some extent, it can be 
said that a netting of beliefs and desires constitutes a significant part of the logical 
relations involving the psychological mode of intentions and its propositional content: 
"Intend (I do A) --» Bel (I do A) & Des (I do A)" (1983: 34) 
 
                                                 
12 For an extensive list of Intentional states, cf. 1983: 4. 
13 Cf. B. Enç, Determinants of Action, 2000: 14. 
14 A. Mele, Springs of Action, 1992: 130. 
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 However, there is nothing in this formula that could account for the “special 
causal role of intentions in producing our behavior” (1983: 34), or in Mele’s suggestive 
expression, the “executive dimension”15 of intentions, which they share with decisions. 
 
3. Intentions in action 
 
 It is precisely in order to be able to account for this executive dimension that 
Searle has to move one step further from more traditional theories of intention and 
introduce the notion of “Intentions in Action”. By doing so he introduces a kind of “bi-
dimensionality” to the very notion of “intention”, somewhat akin to the political 
separation of legislative (“prior intentions”) and executive (“intentions in action”) 
powers. The problem with intentions in action derives from the fact that they seem to 
lack the deliberative stage that some authors find co-essential to the very notion of 
intending. They are so deeply knotted with actual action that they fall under the 
category of “alleged instances of intending to do something in which one has no plan, 
no history of deliberation that resulted in a decision to do that thing” (Enç, 2000: 23). 
The question is then, how do intentions in action stand in relation to the more standard 
notion of “intention” and whether they meet the common criteria that were developed in 
order to segregate “intentions” from other close notions, such as “decisions” or 
“desires”.  
So why does Searle require this separation of powers? Intentions in action 
acquire a strategic importance within Searle’s theory of intentions for at least three 
major reasons. With their introduction it is possible: a) to leave the Bel and Des 
reductionist explanation of intentions; b) to further develop the explanatory parallel 
                                                 
15 Mele, 1992: 154: “I argue here that intention has an executive dimension that goes well beyond 
belief/desire complexes, standardly conceived.” 
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between theory of perception and theory of action by acknowledging the existence in 
the latter of cases of “presentation” as a specific kind of representation (cf. 1983: 79); c) 
to preserve a sufficient level of generality or even a certain fuzziness in the propositional 
content of “prior intentions” without which – as we shall see – the total set of their 
conditions of satisfaction would be enormously complex. Let us start with this latter 
point. 
Actions constitute the conditions of satisfaction of intentions (cf. 1983: 81). But 
it does not follow from this that any action will do or that anything that satisfies an 
intention can be classified as an intentional action. What characteristics must an action 
have vis-à-vis the intention’s content in order to be classifiable among the intention’s 
conditions of satisfaction? Or to put it in reverse, what does an intention require from an 
action?  
The level of specificity or grain of prior intentions is limited in two ways. On 
the one hand, the spectrum of their conditions of satisfaction cannot be so wide as to 
become impossible to account for phenomena of deviance. Given Chisholm’s famous 
example of the uncle’s murder (cf. 1983: 82), it is clear why the nephew’s killing his 
uncle by running him over does not mean that the conditions of satisfaction of his 
intention were met. Although the actual death was an event represented in the 
intentional content, it did not “come about ‘in the right way’ “ (1983: 82), i.e., the 
Intentional state did not stand itself in a correct set of causal relations with the rest of its 
conditions of satisfaction (1983: 85). The actualization of the final event postulated by 
the intention’s content is a necessary but insufficient condition of its satisfaction. We 
realize, again, the importance of “intentions in action” through the acknowledgement 
that the event has to come about ‘in the right way’ means that it must derive from the 
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appropriate complex intention in action ignited by the prior intention16. Nothing else 
will do. In a way, then, if the final result (e.g., the uncle’s death) is just a necessary 
condition of satisfaction, the intention in action (calmly driving to his uncle’s and 
shooting him) could be, if indeed ceteris paribus, a sufficient condition (the problem 
being, of course, that seldom things remain equal during the course of action…)  
On the other hand, the prior intention’s content cannot be so specific as to make 
its satisfaction a completely pre-determined affair, i.e., the notion of  “the right way” 
cannot be over-specific. This is what, in fact Searle means when he writes about the 
“relative indeterminacy of prior intentions” (1983: 93), which is one of the bases for his 
distinction between representation and presentation of conditions of satisfaction. It 
seems too complicated to assume that a prior intention should incorporate in its 
propositional content the entire set of events that would eventually lead to its final goal. 
If this were true, the set of events would indeed become the goal and that is not true of 
prior intentions. When intending something we do coordinate a possible set of events 
towards a final goal. But this set of events is modifiable by way of its being confirmed 
or infirmed during the course of action. The final goal acts as focal point for this 
permanent monitoring, re-evaluation and re-coordination, and this is part of the role of 
being the only necessary event in the package17. Any basic act that is added to the 
package during the process is equally intentional and acquires a position in the set of 
conditions of satisfaction. It is reasonable to expect that the complete set of basic acts be 
somehow virtually represented by the prior intention, but not that they are a priori a part 
of the conditions of satisfaction18. Their being virtually represented means that they are 
                                                 
16 If someone asks the nephew “What are you doing now?” when he runs over the man on the sidewalk, he 
shall eventually answer, “I don’t know”. 
17 Cf. Enç, 2000: 36. 
18 This agrees with Chisholm’s and Enç’s refusal of the principle according to which “when one intends to 
execute the whole package (…) one intends to execute each and every component of the package” (Enç, 
2000: 37). 
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not effective members of the prior intention’s representational content (how could they 
be?), but that they are represented via the intention in action that is indeed one of its 
members. They are, so to speak, a content within a content. Carrying out the prior 
intention of murdering his uncle, the nephew shifts from second gear to third gear. 
When forming his prior intention, he “never gave it a thought” (1983: 85) although the 
action of shifting gears was clearly intentional because “for every conscious intentional 
action there is the experience of performing that action, and that experience has an 
Intentional content” (1983: 90), i.e., a set of conditions of satisfaction framed in a 
certain psychological mode. But it is hard to understand how much weight can be given 
to the fact that the nephew “never gave a thought” to this change of gear (cf. 1983:  85). 
How could that not be part, at least in potential, of that prior intention? Surely he had to 
realize, although potentially, that he had to change gears in order to get to his uncle’s. 
Intentions in action never seem to exhaust in themselves, which is what Searle suggests 
with his idea that “We just act”; they are always transitive experiences of acting. And 
this seems to be true both for intentions in action realized in the process of fulfilling an 
overarching prior intention and for unframed intentions in action. If someone bursts into 
the room and asks the absent pacing man (cf. 1983: 84) “What are you doing now?”, 
there seems that the rules of the appropriate language game would inevitably prompt 
him to say that he is thinking about a philosophical problem. If someone calls the driver 
and asks him the same question while he’s changing gear, it also seems reasonable to 
expect he’ll mention his prior intention “I’m off to the mall”19. Only if someone were 
already in the room at the moment when the man starts pacing around the room, or if the 
interlocutor were already in the car when gears are changed, would the intention in 
action become conscious. That is, only if the interlocutor was already aware of the 
                                                 
19 We are twisting Chisholm’s example a bit since it is not plausible that the driver would blatantly admit that 
he intended to kill his uncle. Cell phone conversations can be easily tapped… 
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agent’s main Intentional state to begin with. So, it seems that prior intentions are much 
more pervasive than Searle suggests them to be. Intentions in action only have meaning 
within the larger framework provided by prior intentions. That is, if they were not 
simply instrumental or subsidiary (cf. 1983: 84) in the context of a larger intention, they 
would not subsist by themselves. If we were to “launch” an intention in action as a mere 
gratuitous entity, outside any prior intention, the intention in action would automatically 
transform itself, so to speak, into a prior intention (compare the shifting from second to 
third gear within the context of fulfilling the conditions of satisfaction of a prior 
intention, and what would the pure act of changing gear be like). The moment we 
become aware of the need to change gear per se, we are immediately representing it, 
i.e., stipulating its conditions of satisfaction instead of merely presenting them. 
Therefore, the acknowledgment of putative intentions in action requires the presence of 
an overarching Intentional state (e.g., thinking of a philosophical problem or intending 
to drive to the mall or to kill one’s uncle). She’s “just walking” around the room 
because she’s engaged in a serious philosophical problem and he’s “just changing gear” 
because he’s driving to the mall”? 20 
These examples are obviously connected to Searle’s distinction between the 
“representational” character of prior intentions (illustrated by the questions asked by the 
outsiders) and the “presentational” character of intentions in action (the insiders’ 
questions). Searle considers that the prior intention is capable of “representing” “the 
whole action as the rest of its conditions of satisfaction” (I, p.93), i.e., its conditions of 
satisfaction = itself + the whole action. The intention in action, however, cannot 
represent. All it can do is to present the actual “physical movement as the rest of its 
conditions of satisfaction” (I, p.93), i.e., its conditions of satisfaction = itself + the 
                                                 
20 It seems then that Mele is right when he points out that “Searle has not shown that we can act intentionally 
without prior intentions” (1992: 184). 
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physical movement. The question seems to be, then, that in order to have just a “pure 
act” or intention in action, we need to perceive the existence of an overarching 
Intentional state. 
The difference between presenting and representing the state’s conditions of 
satisfaction is directly linked to Searle’s parallel between action and perception, which 
the author uses to explain how prior intentions, intentions in action and the bodily 
movement “get together” (1983: 94): the formal relations between the three are the 
mirror image “of the formal relations between the memory, the visual experience of the 
flower and the flower”. Their being mirror images of each other means, of course, that 
their directions of fit and causation stand in juxtaposed symmetrical relations. When we 
say that the prior intention causes the intention in action that causes the bodily 
movement, the direction of fit is world-mind and the direction of causation is mind-
world. When we say that the object causes the experience of seeing the object that 
causes the memory, the direction of fit is mind-world and the direction of causation is 
world-mind. Notice that the verb “causes” does not mean entirely the same thing 
throughout these vectors. When we say that the prior intention causes the intention in 
action we are saying that it stipulates its conditions of satisfaction whereas when we say 
that the intention in action causes the bodily movement, we are actually saying that it 
presents the satisfaction of its conditions. The connection with the actual bodily 
movement is so intense that the use of “cause” here is rather an awkward one since we 
could almost equate the psychological mode and the actualization of conditions of 
satisfaction. Spontaneity, suddenness, impulsiveness, instantaneous reaction, these are 
all expressions connected to Searle’s examples of intentions in action. Take for instance, 
the case of the slapping man (1983: 84). But in this case – as Mele argues (1992: 184) - 
a whole sort of chronological questions arise. If a sudden action leaves insufficient time 
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to form a prior intention, how much time do we need for that? What is the time gap that 
allows us to distinguish between a prior intention and an intention in action? How can 
we really determine whether an intention is so deeply embedded with action that it can 
no longer be classified as “prior”? And in view of that close proximity, how can we 
calculate exactly the direction of fit or causation between them, given the intense flux of 
stimuli and responses that characterize an actual acting? 
A connected question arises from the fact that intentions are commonly 
described as entailing a modifiable plan of actions conducive to a final goal. The plan 
chosen upon deliberation will monitor the succession of events but will also be 
permeable to perceptual feedback and alteration (if one road is blocked, I will take 
another). However this doesn’t seem an attribute of intentions in action since they are 
not representations of their conditions of satisfaction and there seems to exist no time 
gap between the supposed deliberation and its fulfillment. But isn’t the notion of a 
“non-modifiable intention” something quite different from a full-blown intention?21 
And also because they don’t represent their conditions of satisfaction, intentions in 
action, of course, are completely detached from any Belief Requirement. Since we 
cannot report any “history of deliberation that resulted in a decision to do that thing” 
(Enc, 2000: 23) it is also unlikely that we can connect an intention in action to the 
agent’s belief that she will do A or to the agent’s not believing that she (probably) will 
not do A.  
In a way, it seems that we can only refer to intentions in action only in a 
retrospective mode for when we acknowledge them we are no longer referring to them 
as pure presentations of certain conditions of satisfaction but as representations in 
retrospect of conditions of satisfaction: the question “What are you doing now?” tends 
                                                 
21 “It is important that intentions typically are not momentary states but endure from the time of decision to 
the time of intended action, although they can, of course, be modified by later reasoning and abandoned if 
one chages our mind or forgets.” (G. Harman, Change in View, 1986: 78).  
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to be interpreted as “What were you doing just now?” And the answer “I’m just 
walking.” tends to be interpreted “I was just walking.”, also because the psychological 
state of an intention in action is already lost, so to speak, when we answer the question: 
the very event (e.g., our interlocutor’s question) that  prompts the supposition of an 
intention in action deletes it as an actual presentation. Instead of “intentions in action” 
we should probably use the term of “posterior intentions”.  Since the deliberative 
component is absent, we are only left with the explanatory potential of intentions. 
Searle continues to “probe” the parallel between intention and action by 
returning to Wittgenstein’s famous question “If I raise my arm, what is left over if I 
subtract the fact that my arm went up?” Searle’s answer, of course, is that we are left 
with an “experience of acting”. To the analogous question of “If I see the table what is 
left over if I subtract the table?” (1983: 87) we get an analogous answer: we are left 
with a “visual experience”, i.e., “a certain form of presentational Intentionality”. But is 
this really so? If we remove the table we are either left with nothing (since the 
conditions of satisfaction that – because this is a presentation - conflate with the specific 
psychological mode are no longer present) or we are left with the memory of the table. 
Only in relation to this memory of the table can be said that we have a distinctive 
“experience of seeing” detachable from the actual presentation of the object. It is, so to 
speak, the assumption of a common denominator or of a tension between the actual 
experience of seeing the table and the memory of seeing the table that allows us to 
presume the existence of a distinctive experience separate from both. And if we accept 
the need for something akin to Kant’s “unity of transcendental apperception”, we would 
also acknowledge that every perceptual experience is linked with the memory of other 
experiences: it is this linkage that would allow us to take this experience of seeing as 
being mine. That is why we cannot talk about an abstract or pure experience of seeing. 
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If we accept this, and we accept the parallel drawn by Searle, it seems that we cannot 
also talk about an “experience of acting” or of an intention in action except in 
conjunction of the experience of an actual bodily movement and the prior intention with 
which that bodily movement was performed. That is, if we subtract the fact that the arm 
went up we are left with the assumption of a common denominator between the prior 
intention and that bodily movement. But Searle doesn’t seem to have given us sufficient 
reasons to attribute this common denominator a distinctive logical status.  
It seems that we can have two ways of reading the formula “Intention in action”. 
We can read it either as referring to a distinctive Intentional event – which is Searle’s 
conception – or, literally, as intentions in action, i.e., as intentions qua actions, which 
could also mean actions qua intentions. Perceived in this latter fashion, they don’t help 
us much in a better understanding of the connection between intentions and actions, 
namely, by stating the specific feature responsible for the intention’s executive 
capability (which is, after all, Searle’s main project (cf. 1983: 81)). But they may be 
able to better remind us of the nature of our quest, namely, the search for the conditions 
that make the conceptual partial overlapping of our notions of action and intention 
possible. 
There seems to exist yet another related problem regarding what happens when 
we don’t have a prior intention to begin with. When I stroll around the house while 
obsessed with a philosophical problem, what keeps together my wandering about and 
my so-called “intentions in action” if we don’t have a prior intention that would act as a 
“focal point” to which this connection would be pointed to? Also, it seems that 
intentions in action can be infinitely divided into more and more minute “intentions in 
action” and so we could have an infinite number of answers to the question “What are 
you doing now?”: “I’m walking around the room.”, “I’m putting one foot in front of the 
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other.” “I’m distributing my weight alternatively from one foot to the other.” etc. This 
constitute part of the explanation for Searle’s introduction of a difference between the 
prior intention’s representation of its conditions of satisfaction and the intention in 
action’s presentation of its conditions of satisfaction. If all these subsidiary actions were 
actively present in the Intentional content, that would mean that the agent had the real 
intention of doing all of them, which would be absurd and make the stipulation of its 
conditions of satisfaction a hugely complicated task: 
"… there will be a large number of subsidiary acts that are not 
represented by the prior intention but are presented by the 
intentions in action: I intentionally start the engine, shift gears, 
pass slow-moving vans (…) and so on with dozens of subsidiary 
acts that are performed intentionally but need not have been 
represented by my prior intention.” (1983: 93, n.10) 
 
But this only seems to transpose the difficulty to the level of intentions in action. 
And although “Searle does not commit himself to the implausible view that there is a 
distinct intention in action for each subsidiary intentional action (e.g., for each step I 
take in walking to work)”22 the question still remains. If I have the complex intention in 
action of shifting gear, that automatically entails a whole range of other subsidiary 
actions: I have to press the clutch, my arm reaches the handle “in a certain way and at a 
certain speed, etc” (1983: 93). So, in a way, every intention in action requires for its 
being a presentation of conditions of satisfaction (e.g. that I am actually having the 
experience of changing gear) that it also be a representation of a whole sub-set of other 
intentions in action. Searle’s oscillation between his usage of the plural “intentions in 
action” and the singular “intention in action” or even “complex intention in action” (cf. 
1983: 98) seems to complicate the issue. How far then can we really go in this division 
of intentions in action? How can we discriminate the entire range of its components? 
And what holds them together if we cannot talk here of “prior intentions” or of a real 
                                                 
22 Mele, 1992: 183 
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representation of conditions of satisfaction? The pure experience of acting? Is it 
sufficient then to say that its conditions of satisfaction lie in the basic fact that I’m 
having the “experience of acting”, that I am having this immediate experience, that is 
completely irrepresentable due to the inextricable connection between the psychological 
mode and its Intentional content (because in a way the psychological mode and its 
conditions of satisfaction are the same, i.e., there is no discontinuity, in the perspective 
of the agent, between his experience of his moving the arm and the fact that the arm is 
moving; he could not substitute that experience for a similar one)? But wouldn’t the 
acknowledgement of a sub-set of “intentions in action” jeopardize this notion of a pure 
experience of acting? How deeply submerged in action can an intention really be, and 
still continue to be an Intentional state (i.e., a set with two distinct components: 
conditions of satisfaction in a specific psychological mode)?23 
 
4. Final Summary 
 
In this paper I have tried to point out some difficulties concerning Searle’s 
admission of intention in action as a distinct, self-subsistent, Intentional state. More 
specifically, I’ve argued that intentions in action lack some of the most important 
features that are usually associated with the overall concept of “intention”. First of all, 
intentions in action seem to lack the “deliberative stage” commonly attributed to 
intentions. They are so deeply knotted with actual action that they cannot be traced to 
                                                 
23 Mele prefers to identify intentions in action with “a species of trying” (1992: 183). Why are 
all my driving movements intentional? “They are intentional because [I am] successfully trying to [make 
these movements], because [I am] making an effective effort, however minimal that effort may be, to 
[make these movements]” (Mele, 1992: 183). But trying because of what? Because of the prior intention 
to drive to the mall. And this is just another way of stating the pervasiveness of the prior intention, which 
“may continue to play a causal role in [my driving] even after the action begins – a role that may involve 
motivation and guidance” (Mele, 1992: 184). However, this idea of a series of encapsulated “tryings” 
taking place within the fulfillment of the conditions of satisfaction of a prior intention only seems to give 
the problem another name. 
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any episode of deliberation or planning. Secondly, it is difficult to understand what is 
meant with the notion that people “never gave a thought” when acting according to 
intentions in action and the attached idea of a “pure act” is also hard to fully grasp. It 
seems more plausible to admit that intentions in action can only occur within the context 
of fulfilling another overarching Intentional state, e.g., an overarching prior intention. 
The moment we become aware of the “presentation” of an intention in action it changes 
its character as “pure acting”. Thirdly, the distinction between intentions in action and 
prior intentions raises an important set of chronological questions. For instance, how 
much time do we need in order to form a prior intention? How can we establish the 
boundary that separates a planning of an action – however brief that planning may be – 
from the impulsiveness that characterizes intentions in action?, or when does 
impulsiveness stop and planning begins? Fourthly, by their being presentations of their 
conditions of satisfaction, intentions in action constitute themselves as “non-modifiable” 
intentions. But the notion of something like a “non-modifiable intention” seems to be 
quite different from the concept of what constitutes a real intention. Fifthly, the question 
“What are you doing now?” which is used as a criterion for the acknowledgement of 
intentions in action tends to be interpreted as “What were you doing just now?”. Thus, it 
seems we cannot refer to intentions in action as pure presentations of their conditions of 
satisfaction but only as representations in retrospect of conditions of satisfaction. 
Sixthly, and following Searle’s analogy between perception and action, we require the 
assumption of a common denominator between the memory of an object and the actual 
experience of seeing the object in order to infer the existence of a “distinctive” 
experience of seeing, just like we require the assumption of a common denominator 
between a prior intention and a bodily movement in order to infer the existence of a 
“distinctive” intention in action. In both cases, we require both memories and prior 
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intentions in order to obtain the concepts of “experience of seeing” and “experience of 
acting”, which constitutes a problem if we want to attribute to the latter an independent 
status. Finally, every intention requires in order to be a representation of conditions of 
satisfaction that it also must be a representation of a sub-set of other intentions in 
action, which goes against Searle’s description of intentions in action as pure 
presentations of conditions of satisfaction. 
 
 
 
   
